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Abstract 
Contrary to what has been argued by a number of critics, the AD-AS framework is both 
internally consistent and in conformity with Keynes’s own analysis. Moreover, the 
eclectic approach to behavioral foundations allows models in this tradition to take into 
account aggregation problems as well as evidence from behavioral economics. 
Unencumbered by the straightjacket of optimizing microfoundations, the approach can 
provide a useful starting point for the analysis of dynamic macroeconomic interactions. 
In developing this analysis, the AD-AS approach can draw on insights from the Post 
Keynesian, neo-Marxian and structuralist traditions, as well as from the burgeoning 
literature on behavioral economics. 
 
 
Key words: AD-AS, Keynes, New Keynesian theory, microeconomic foundations 
 
JEL classification: E12, O11, B22, B41, B50. 
 
 
                                                 
* Department of Economics and Policy Studies, Faculty of Economics, University of Notre Dame, Notre 
Dame, IN 46556; email: adutt@nd.edu 
† Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01002; email: 
pskott@econs.umass.edu. 1. Introduction 
Several turn-of-the-century assessments of the state of macroeconomics regard the 
discipline as healthy. There may have been fierce debates and controversies, but these 
debates mainly served to highlight deficiencies of existing models and to stimulate the 
creation of new improved hybrid models. The history of macroeconomics, according to 
Blanchard  (2000, p. 1375) is “one of a surprisingly steady accumulation of knowledge”, 
and “progress in macroeconomics may well be the success story of twentieth century 
economics”. Woodford’s (1999) assessment gives slightly more weight to the 
disagreements and revolutions in the second half of the twentieth century.  But Woodford 
also sees convergence, and he concludes that “modern macroeconomic models are 
intertemporal general equilibrium models derived from the same foundations of 
optimizing behavior on the part of households and firms as are employed in other 
branches of economics” (p. 31). 
  We disagree with these assessments. In our view, a large part of what has 
happened in macroeconomics since the late 1960s has been a wasteful detour. A 
generation of macroeconomists has grown up learning tools that may be sophisticated, 
but the usefulness of these tools is questionable. Moreover, a great deal of damage may 
be, and has been, done when the tools are applied to real-world situations. 
  In this paper we shall argue that, for all their limitations, the simple models of the 
old Keynesian school using the Aggregate Demand-Aggregate Supply (AD-AS) 
framework  provide a better starting point for serious analysis than more recent models in 
the New Keynesian (NK) or Real Business Cycle (RBC) traditions which have come to 
dominate modern macroeconomics. The obsession with optimization and microeconomic 
  1foundations has meant that a promising Keynesian research program has been largely 
abandoned. Our preferred version of this program builds on the old Keynesian models, 
but extends and modifies them to accommodate insights from the post Keynesian, neo-
Marxian, and structuralist traditions. 
  The main emphasis in this paper is on the usefulness and shortcomings of the 
basic AD-AS framework, and on how the framework may be developed and improved. 
Section 2 outlines a standard version of the AD-AS model and shows that it can be given 
a logically consistent Marshallian interpretation. It also shows that the model does not, as 
claimed by some critics, suffer from internal logical contradictions. Section 3 discusses 
some alleged shortcomings of the model. Section 4 considers the NK alternative, 
focusing on two main issues: microeconomic foundations and the treatment of stability. 
Section 5 introduces post Keynesian and other arguments for the relevance of aggregate 
demand, not just in the short run but also as an influence on real outcomes in the medium 
and the long run. Section 6, finally, ends with a few concluding remarks. 
 
2. The AD-AS framework 
Following Keynes, the AD-AS approach visualizes the economy as a whole, that is, the 
theory is ‘general’ rather than ‘partial’.
1  Keynes’s (1936/1973) derivation of a fix-wage 
general equilibrium in chapters 1-18 of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money (GT) was an enormous intellectual achievement, and the one stressed by both 
Blanchard and Woodford in their accounts of the Keynesian revolution. The AD-AS 
framework gives a reasonable representation of the analytical skeleton behind this fix-
  2wage general equilibrium. The strength of the AD-AS apparatus is precisely the explicit 
attempt to integrate the analysis of goods, labor and financial markets.  
  The AD-AS framework divides the economy into two parts – the ‘demand side’ 
and the ‘supply side’ – and examines their interaction using accounting identities, 
equilibrium conditions and behavioral and institutional equations.  The ‘demand side’ 
typically examines factors relating to the demand for goods and the demand and supply 
of assets.  The ‘supply side’ typically examines factors relating to output and pricing 
decisions of producers, and factor markets.  The framework ensures that neither demand 
nor supply side factors are overlooked in the analysis and that macroeconomic outcomes 
depend on the interaction between the different markets.  The particular partitioning into 
‘aggregate demand’ and ‘aggregate supply’ along with the choice of terminology may 
provide the pedagogic advantage of making macroeconomic analysis possible in terms of 
the same tools as the simplest microeconomic model of the market.
  But this advantage 
comes at a high price.  The aggregate demand and supply curves embody complex 
interactions and are clearly not the same as the microeconomic curves which take a 
partial view of the economy.  The analogy therefore is spurious, and forgetting this has 
led to a great deal of confusion in the literature, as briefly discussed later. 
The basic AD-AS model is well-known, of course, but to ease the exposition it is 
helpful to state a simple version of it explicitly. There are two equilibrium conditions  
                                                    Y = C + I + G                                                                (1) 
 
                                                       M/P = L,                                                                     (2) 
 
  3where, in standard notation, Y is real output, C,  I and G, denote real consumption, 
investment and government expenditure, M the supply of money, P the price level, and L 
the real demand for money, and six behavioral or institutional equations 
                                                        C = C(Y),                                                                   (3)        
 
                                                         I = I(r),                                                                     (4) 
    
                                                       L = L (Y, r),                                                                 (5) 
 
                                                        Y = F(N),                                                                   (6) 
 
                                                   W/P
e  = F’(N)                                                                 (7) 
 
                                                         W = W0                                                                      (8) 
 
where 0<C’<1, I’<0, L1>0, L2 < 0, F’>0 and F”<N, and where r is the rate of interest, N 
the level of employment, W the money wage, and P
e is the price expected by firms. 
Equations (3) through (6) are standard consumption, investment, money demand and 
production functions.  Since C, I and L are used to denote desired amounts in equations 
(3) through (5), equations (1) and (2) are equilibrium conditions (rather than accounting 
identities) showing that output is equal to the demand for it and that the money supply in 
real terms is equal to the demand for it. Behind these equilibrium conditions lie dynamic 
adjustment processes with excess demand for goods leading to an increase in P and 
excess demand for money leading to an increase in r.
2  Equation (6) is the profit 
maximizing condition of firms that are assumed to be price takers in perfectly 
competitive markets; since there is a production lag and firms make production plans 
prior to knowing what price they will receive for their goods, the price that is relevant for 
their production decision is the expected price. The levels of M, G and W are given 
  4exogenously.  To stress that this is the case for the money wage, equation (7) states that 
the money wage is given at the exogenous level W0. 
  Our interpretation of the model is Marshallian and we examine the behavior of the 
economy in two different ‘runs’. The expected price and the level of output are given in 
the ‘market’ (or ‘ultra-short’) run.  In the ‘short’ run  expected price changes in response 
to its deviations from the actual price, and this change is accompanied by changes in the 
level of production; in a short-run equilibrium expectations are being met and the 






  In the market run, given P
e, and given W from equation (8), N is determined by 
equation (7), and Y  by equation (6).  For this level of Y, substitution of equations (3) and 
(4) into equation (1) yields a value of r which satisfies that equation, irrespective of the 
price level.  The IS curve in Figure 1, which shows equilibrium in the goods market in 
(P,r)-space , is vertical at this level of r.












  5adjustments when the economy is out of goods market equilibrium. Also for the given 
level of Y, substitution of equation (5) into equation (2) yields a positive LM relation 
between  P and r, which represents money (and assets) market equilibrium.  The 
horizontal arrows show the direction of interest adjustments when the economy is out of 
money-market equilibrium.  The intersection of the IS and LM curves gives the market-
run equilibrium values of P and r.  The equilibrium value of r is determined by the 
position of the vertical IS curve, and the LM curve determines the value of P.  With off-
equilibrium dynamics given by the equations in note 2, it is readily seen that the market-
run equilibrium is stable for a given Y.  
  In the short run P
e is allowed to change in response to unfulfilled expectations.   
When P
e changes to a new level, firms adjust their employment and output levels.  This 
adjustment is captured by the AS curve, which shows the profit-maximizing level of 
output produced by the firms for a given P
e.  When Y changes, the IS and LM curves shift 
in (r,P)-space and determine a new market-run equilibrium of r and P.  The level of P 
which clears goods and money markets for each level of Y is shown along the AD curve.  
A higher level of Y increases the level of saving, so that goods market equilibrium 
requires an increase in investment, a fall in r and hence a leftward shift of the IS curve.  
A higher level of Y increases the real demand for money, so that money market 
equilibrium requires a fall in P (or an increase in r), so that the LM curve shifts to the 
right in (r,P)-space.  Consequently, a higher Y implies a lower P for market-run 
equilibrium, explaining the negative slope of the AD curve. 
  The short-run dynamics shown in Figure 1 can be described as follows. Starting 
from an initial level of expected price, P
e
1, output is determined at Y1 (as shown by the 
  6AS curve) and price at P1 (as shown by the AD curve).  Since P1 > P
e
1, if firms revise 
their price expectations adaptively, P
e rises, making Y expand along the AS curve and the 
market-run equilibrium move along the AD curve (representing shifts in the IS and LM 
curve) as shown by the arrow.  This adjustment will continue till the economy arrives at 
the short-run equilibrium at the intersection of the AD and AS curves, where P = P
e.
4
  Three comments about this model are in order.  First, the Marshallian 
interpretation of the model finds a great deal of exegetical support in Keynes’s own work 
and in the writings of many Keynesians.  Clower (1989), for instance, notes the 
Marshallian aspects of Keynes’s GT, although not as precisely as done in our model (see 
Dutt, 1992). 
Second, the Marshallian interpretation is important for the internal consistency of 
the economic argument. It has been argued by Barro (1994), Fields and Hart (1990), 
Colander (1995) and Bhaduri, Laski and Riese (1999) that the AD-AS model embodies 
two mutually-contradictory approaches to pricing and production by firms.  According to 
this criticism, the AD curve is based on IS and LM curves, but the analysis assumes that 
firms fix the price (having the ability to do so) and that equilibrium levels of r and Y are 
determined from equations (1) and (2), using (3) through (5). The story told is that firms 
fix their price and adjust their output in response to changes in demand conditions. The 
AS curve, on the other hand, assumes price taking behavior on the part of firms operating 
in purely competitive markets with demand constraints, producing to maximize profits 
given the money wage and the production function. While some textbook versions of the 
AD-AS model do suffer from this inconsistency, our Marshallian model is free of it.  The 
equations of the model are similar to those of the standard textbook version,
5 but in our 
  7interpretation the AD and AS curves both embody profit maximization and price-taking 
behavior: the AD curve in our interpretation shows equilibrium price for a given level of 
output and not, as the standard AD curve, the equilibrium value of Y for different levels 
of P. 
6
Third, the model can easily be recast using Keynes’s own ‘AD-AS diagram’ with 
employment and the value of output (price times quantity) on the axes (he did not 
actually draw this diagram in GT, but described it in words in chapter 3).
7 Keynes’s 
Aggregate Supply function is given by W0F(N)/F’(N) and is derived from equations (6), 
(7) and (8): its curve shows the expected value of output at each level of employment 
consistent with profit maximizing behavior. The Aggregate Demand function is derived 
from equations (1) through (6), and its curve shows the actual equilibrium proceeds (PY) 
for any given level of N.  The level of N determines Y from equation (6), and given this Y, 
P is determined as shown in the IS-LM diagram of Figure 1, which determines the 
equilibrium level of PY. The value of aggregate demand at the intersection between the 
supply and demand curves defines “the effective demand” (GT, p. 25).  
By construction expectations are being met at the point of effective demand. In 
chapter 5 of GT, however, Keynes discusses the formation and revision of short-period 
expectations, showing how firms produce a certain level of output with a certain level of 
employment, given short period expectations, and then adjust these expectations if they 
are not fulfilled.  Though he does not explicitly analyze this process, we can do so by 
using the expected proceeds curve, given by P
eY = P
eF(N), for a given P
e from equation 
(6):  it shows what firms expect the value of output to be for a given price expectation. 
The intersection of this curve with the curve for the Aggregate Supply function 
  8determines the market-run equilibrium level of employment since it satisfies equation (7). 
For the market-run equilibrium employment level, one can read off actual proceeds from 
the Aggregate Demand function.  If actual proceeds are different from expected proceeds, 
P
e will change, shifting the expected proceeds curve, till the economy arrives at short-run 
equilibrium at the intersection of all three curves.
8  For most of the GT, however, Keynes 
confines attention to short-run equilibrium in which actual and expected price are equal, 
thereby concealing the Marshallian adjustment process because it was not central to his 
demonstration of the possibility of unemployment short-run equilibrium.
9   
 
3. Shortcomings 
An AD-AS model of the type just described has many well-known weaknesses and 
limitations, of which three are relevant for our purposes.  
The criticisms that have received the most attention concern the alleged lack of 
microeconomic foundations of the model.  NKs (along with new classical economists and 
RBC theorists), who have been vocal in this criticism, wish to supplant the model with 
models based on explicit optimization. We shall take up the issue of optimizing 
microfoundations in section 4 where we discuss the NK approach. But the behavioral 
approach of the AD-AS model has also been criticized from another angle. Many post 
Keynesian economists, but also some impeccably mainstream old Keynesians, have 
suggested that the model is too mechanical and does not take into account uncertainty and 
expectations in a serious manner.
10 It is beyond the scope of the present paper to address 
this important issue in any detail but in our view, ‘mechanical’ mathematical 
formalization can be extremely useful. This formalization needs to be supplemented by 
  9verbal descriptions and empirical analysis, and less formal discussions of possible 
outcomes may also come into play if the relations determining the evolution of the 
system are not capable of being formalized in a precise manner. Even this informal 
discussion, however, will often benefit from using more formal analyses as points of 
reference and by suggesting where and how the results of the models may need to be 
modified.  
A second set of criticisms claims that the AD-AS model omits many important 
features of reality and that some of its implications are not consistent with empirical 
observation.  Assumptions of imperfect competition, for instance, should replace perfect 
competition, and the money supply should not be treated as an exogenous variable in an 
economy with modern monetary institutions.
11  The consumption function should also 
take into account income distributional effects on consumption, increases in aggregate 
demand should provide a direct stimulus to investment, and the distinction between 
nominal and real rates of interest may be critical (not least for the reactions of aggregate 
demand to changes in money wages and the stability of full employment). These (and 
other) modifications may complicate the model and affect some of its properties, but in 
principle their introduction is quite straightforward and the resulting model can still be 
depicted with AD and AS curves (see, for instance, Dutt and Skott, 1996). The 
modifications, moreover, help to address some of the empirical criticisms of the AD-AS 
model. The simple model, for instance, predicts a counter-cyclical movement of the real 
wage. This implication, which finds little support in the data (as noted early on by 
Dunlop, 1938, Tarshis, 1939), no longer holds in versions of the model that include 
imperfect competition (perhaps with markup pricing à la Kalecki, 1971) and some 
  10combination of non-diminishing returns to labor and/or a counter-cyclical pattern in the 
markup.  
A third set of problems with the AD-AS model concerns the unsatisfactory 
treatment of dynamics. There is a lack of integration between the analysis of the short-run 
and more long-term issues, and even when it comes to the treatment of the short run, the 
analysis often relies on unstated or questionable assumptions concerning the process 
leading to a short-run Keynesian equilibrium. Our own presentation above is quite 
explicit in its assumptions (notes 2 and 4) but, perhaps unrealistically, it presumes that the 
adjustment to market-run equilibrium is ‘very fast’ relative to the adjustments of price 
expectations. The adjustment to market-run equilibrium could therefore be based on 
given price expectations, and in the analysis of adjustments to short-run equilibrium it 
could be assumed that there is continuous market equilibrium during the adjustment 
process.
12    
The shortcomings of simple AD-AS models with respect to dynamics may be a 
legacy of Keynes's own focus on short-run equilibria in GT.  The assumption of fulfilled 
expectations facilitated the presentation of the fix-wage general equilibrium.
13  
Unfortunately, it makes it hard to discuss the stability issues, and from today's 
perspective – having before us a well-developed theory of general equilibrium – the truly 
revolutionary and provocative message of the GT concerns the destabilizing effects of 
money wage flexibility, rather than the existence of a fix-wage equilibrium with 
unemployment.  
The AD-AS model does not address the stability issue – it takes the money wage 
as given - but can serve as a starting point. The model can be easily extended in a way 
  11which makes it have the implications presented in the typical textbook: (i) that 
unemployment can exist in the model because the money wage is exogenously fixed; (ii) 
that if one allows the money wage to fall in response to the existence of unemployment, 
the AS curve, given by P = F’(F
-1(Y))/W is shifted downwards; and that (iii) this leads to 
an expansion of output and employment along the negatively-sloped AD curve and 
moves the economy to the ‘natural rate of unemployment’ (corresponding to the absence 
of Keynesian involuntary unemployment). The mechanism behind this adjustment is the 
‘Keynes effect’ by which a reduction in wage and price increases the real supply of 
money, lowers the interest rate, and increases investment and aggregate demand.  This 
effect can be supplemented by the real balance effect by which the rise in real balances 
directly stimulates the aggregate demand for goods.   
This standard analysis is at odds with Keynes’s own argument in GT where, in 
chapter 19, he insisted that involuntary unemployment would not be eliminated by 
increased wage flexibility. Falling money wages will influence the economy in a number 
of ways but, on balance, are unlikely to stimulate output.
14 Keynes's analysis of the 
effects of changes in money wages may have been sketchy, but the logic behind potential 
instability is impeccable. The real balance effect was overlooked by Keynes, but has been 
found to be empirically insignificant, and the expansionary effects of a decline in money 
wages due to the Keynes effect may be more than offset by the adverse influences of debt 
deflation, distributional shifts, and expectations of continuing reductions of wages and 
prices. ‘Old Keynesians’ have been aware of these stability problems (see Tobin, 1975), 
and post Keynesians have stressed additional problems arising from the role of 
  12uncertainty, the financial situation of firms and the effects of an endogenous money 
supply.   
These complicating factors can be addressed by an informal discussion of the 
diverse effects of money wage changes, using the AD-AS model as the starting point. 
This is basically what Keynes did in chapter 19 of GT.  The analysis and the destabilizing 
effects can be illustrated using the AD-AS diagram (see Dutt and Amadeo, 1990).  For 
instance, debt deflation problems can make the AD curve upward-sloping and, in 
addition, money wage reductions can shift the AD curve to the left (because of a higher 
propensity to consume out of wage income than non-wage income), both of which 
prevent the economy from converging to the ‘natural’ level of output.  The analysis can 
be made more precise by incorporating specific effects into more general Keynesian 
models in order to formally examine the stability question, as done by Chiarella and 
Flaschel (2000), among others. Their analysis demonstrates that the Keynesian models 
can generate very complex dynamics and that local instability is a likely outcome for 
plausible specifications. 
 
4. The New Keynesian detour 
The New Keynesian approach can be characterized as one which attempts to derive 
Keynesian conclusions with respect to the existence of unemployment equilibrium and/or 
the effectiveness of aggregate demand policy, while using a standard neoclassical 
methodology.   
Unemployment equilibrium can be explained in terms of the optimizing behavior 
of agents in models that depart from Walrasian perfect competition by introducing 
  13perceived demand curves for imperfectly competitive firms, asymmetric information, 
efficiency wages, credit rationing, and the like.
15  Some of these models are very 
insightful, but they largely fail to address the issue of involuntary unemployment in 
Keynes’s sense. Keynes explicitly defined ‘voluntary unemployment’ to include all 
frictional and structural unemployment, that is, to include unemployment caused by 
minimum wage legislation and excessive union wage demands, for instance. By 
extension, Keynes’s notion of voluntary unemployment also includes structural 
unemployment generated by the various departures from perfect competition that have 
been invoked by NK. Structural unemployment of this kind may be theoretical interesting 
and empirically significant, but it is not the kind of unemployment addressed by Keynes. 
His involuntary unemployment is defined in terms of inadequate aggregate demand and 
the failure of the market mechanism to ensure the adjustment of aggregate demand to the 
level of aggregate supply associated with a structurally determined (minimum) rate of 
unemployment. It is the deviation from a structural unemployment rate that makes 
demand policy desirable. 
In NK models the effectiveness of aggregate demand policy is confined to the 
short run and derives from nominal wage and price rigidities. Some of the early NK 
models were of the spanner-in-the-works variety which merely introduced nominal wage 
and price rigidities into new classical or RBC models with rational expectations.  But the 
NK methodology requires that such rigidities be based on optimizing behavior: “rather 
than postulating that prices and wages respond mechanically to some measure of market 
disequilibrium, they are set optimally, that is, so as to best serve the interests of the 
parties assumed to set them, according to the information available at the time” 
  14(Woodford 2003, p.7). Thus, prices and wages are set in a forward-looking manner, 
expectations are assumed to be rational, and preferences are regarded as structural and 
invariant to changes in policy. 
Our comments on the NK approach focus on two issues: the obsession with 
microeconomic foundations based on explicit optimization, and the treatment of stability 
issues. The two issues are related since the obsession with optimization stands in the way 
of serious stability analysis. 
4.1 Optimization 
Optimization, in our view, can sometimes be very useful as a simple way of describing 
goal-oriented behavior (indeed, both our simple AD-AS model and Keynes’s own 
analysis included the assumption of profit maximizing firms). But insisting on 
optimization can also result in problems. The problems with the optimization approach 
are largely well-known and a brief summary of some of the main points will suffice. 
  The cognitive limitations and bounded rationality of all real-world decision 
makers have been stressed by many authors, most notably perhaps by Simon, and a more 
recent literature has documented the existence of systematic departures from optimizing 
behavior (see Kahneman, 2000, and Camerer et al., 2004). From this perspective the NK 
demand for optimizing microeconomic foundations is remarkable primarily because of 
the highly restrictive form that it takes.
16  
  Aggregation represents another problem for the optimizing approach. To obtain 
definite results, any theory of the economy as a whole has to engage in aggregation. 
Thus, there can be no attempt at full disaggregation in the agent space, as in Arrow-
Debreu models of general equilibrium, and it is well-known that even if all individual 
  15agents were fully rational and maximized well-behaved utility functions subject to 
standard constraints, the aggregate variables do not behave as if determined by an 
optimizing representative agent (see, for instance, Kirman, 1992).  Aggregation problems 
therefore imply that the use of an optimizing representative agent in NK models has little 
to recommend itself.  
  The existence of social norms and conventions provides a further reason to 
eschew the mechanical application of optimization methods based on exogenously given 
and constant preferences. The role of relative wages and norms of fairness in Keynes’s 
GT analysis of wage formation presents an example of this perspective. The existence of 
norms and conventions may be a source of ‘conditional stability’ in Keynesian models of 
uncertainty (Crotty, 1994) but norms and conventions also change over time, both 
endogenously and as a result of exogenous shocks. We shall return to these issues in 
section 5 below.  
  A more subtle danger of the optimization approach is that it may predispose the 
analysis to slide from individual ‘rationality’ to systemic ‘rationality’. Some economists 
may view optimization is simply an organizing principle (see note 16), but countless 
examples suggest that an optimization approach may generate (sometimes unconsciously) 
a slippery slope in which individual optimization eventually leads to social optimality.  
Sargent (1993), for instance, is able to assume bounded rationality and yet produce, 
eventually, his unique, new classical equilibrium. As a second example, many of the 
problems caused by efficiency wage considerations can be ‘solved’ when credit markets 
function efficiently (again, with clever institutions). A history of how a focus on 
  16individual optimization in neoclassical economics inexorably, albeit tortuously, has led to 
presumptions of social optimality awaits an author, if one does not exist already. 
A serious problem, finally, arises from the bounded rationality of the theorist. 
Carrying the straightjacket of optimization – especially in its dynamic versions – reduces 
the ability of the theory to incorporate many important aspects of reality in a tractable 
manner, and therefore encourages the theorist to ignore them. One may insist on treating 
all agents in a model as fully optimizing, but there is a cost to meeting this demand. 
Simplifications then need to be made in other areas in order to keep the model tractable; 
the number of distinct agents, for instance, may have to be kept very small and the nature 
of the interaction between the agents very simple.  
All useful models, of course, represent drastically stylized pictures of a complex 
reality. The art of model building consists in choosing appropriate simplifying 
assumptions, and in our view the insistence on fully optimizing behavior represents a 
suboptimal ‘corner solution’ to the modeling problem: the gains from explicit 
optimization are often minimal and the costs of the required simplifications in other areas 
high. Thus, over the last 30 years macroeconomists have struggled to solve problems of 
intertemporal optimization. These optimization problems grossly simplify real-world 
decision problems, and the astounding implicit presumption has been that agents in the 
real world solve (or act as if they had solved) these much more complex problems. The 
neglect of aggregation problem and the use of representative agents in models that 
purport to provide microeconomic foundations only serve to make the picture even more 
bizarre. In fact, the contemporary approach with its sophisticated and perfectly rational 
representative agents would seem to embody a good example of how not to use 
  17mathematics: mathematical models arguably are useful primarily because they allow a 
clear analysis of complex interactions between agents, each of whom may follow 
relatively simple (but possibly changing) behavioral rules.   
4.2 Stability and rational expectations 
NK models may include non-clearing labor markets and allow for real effects of 
aggregate demand policy. But it is assumed that, in the absence of shocks, the economy 
converges to an equilibrium position, and cyclical fluctuations are generated by 
introducing stochastic shocks into models with a stable equilibrium solution. If only 
prices and wages were flexible, there would be no Keynesian problems of effective 
demand. 
The stability concerns that were at the centre of Keynes’s message have been 
largely forgotten.
17 Is there a NK answer to these stability concerns? Not really. Stability 
is simply assumed in NK models. The models typically involve saddlepoints and jump 
variables, and the presumption of stability is used to pin down the outcome in the short 
run. Agents have rational expectations, and the jump variables seek out the stable 
saddlepath. Thus, to the extent that there is an answer, it comes from the NK focus on 
microfoundations and rational expectations, and from the implicit rejection of the old 
Keynesian analysis because of its alleged deficiencies in these areas.  
  Rational expectations have been used before Muth and Lucas, although without 
using that name.  Keynes’s own GT approach of assuming that short-period expectations 
are fulfilled is an example of rational expectations in the sense of perfect foresight, and 
Harrod's (1939) warranted growth path also represents a rational expectations path. But 
the extension of rational expectations to all models - and not just steady growth paths or 
  18Robinsonian mythical ages - lacks both theoretical and empirical foundations.  We 
confine our attention to a few observations about theory. 
  The theoretical argument relies on the claim that the systematic deviations 
characterizing other specifications would lead to changes in expectation formation. This 
claim has some force and, indeed, changing expectations may be an important source of 
instability (as suggested by the role of ‘animal spirits’ in Keynesian analyses). But the 
claim this does not justify a focus on rational expectations. It has been notoriously 
difficult to get convergence to rational expectations even in simple models of rational 
learning, and the real-world learning process takes place within a complex overall 
environment and one that is subject to constant and profound technical and institutional 
change (Frydman and Phelps, 1983). These changes in the environment may lead to shifts 
in expectations; indeed, some institutional or structural change is often invoked to justify 
expectations that would otherwise seem unreasonable, viz. the appeal to a ‘new economy’ 
during the stock market boom of the 1990s. However, structural and institutional changes 
of this kind count against rational expectations since the learning processes underlying 
the claims in favor of rational expectations fare better in a stable environment.
18
It should be noted, finally, that a dismissal of stability concerns cannot be justified 
by reference to Walrasian general equilibrium theory. In fact, the realization that stability 
had not and probably could not be established under reasonable assumptions may have 
been a critical factor behind the virtual abandonment in microeconomics of all research 
on Walrasian general equilibrium theory (Kirman, 1989, Katzner 2004).
19   
The use of individual optimization therefore does not imply that one can ignore 
stability issues, and in fact not all contributions that can be called NK have ignored these 
  19issues.  A notable exception is the work of Hahn and Solow (1995), who develop an 
overlapping-generations model and introduce real money balances using a variant of the 
Clower constraint to show that wage-price flexibility can result in macroeconomic 
instability. They also show that wage and price sluggishness as explained by standard NK 
techniques can be stabilizing but also prevent the economy from attaining full 
employment. However, unlike many of the other elegant theoretical contributions of 
these authors, the model becomes extremely unwieldy, primarily due to its optimizing 
assumptions (despite the artificial way money is introduced) and they have to resort to 
simulation techniques to examine the behavior of the economy.  
 
5. Post Keynesian, structuralist and neo-Marxian alternatives 
 
The AD-AS tradition – including the recent work on ‘integrated Keynesian 
disequilibrium dynamics’ by Chiarella and Flaschel and their associates – rightly stresses 
the need to consider dynamic interactions across markets, and it is justifiably critical of 
optimization methodology. But theories in the AD-AS tradition need to be developed not 
just in terms of more advanced mathematical analysis of the dynamic interactions but 
also in terms of a renewed attention to the behavioral assumptions and their implications 
for the specification of the various equations.  
The behavioral foundations, of course, have not been neglected in the Keynesian 
literature, as is evident from even a cursory look at Keynes's own analysis or the efforts 
of many old Keynesians. Nonetheless, some of the presumptions of the AD-AS tradition 
seem questionable from a heterodox perspective. A post Keynesian approach questions 
the limited role of aggregate demand in determining medium- and long-run growth 
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distribution and its interaction with the rate of accumulation and the movements in the 
‘reserve army of labor’; a structuralist approach (see Taylor, 1991, 2004) emphasizes the 
need to examine how the structural and institutional characteristics of economies 
determine their dynamics.   
  It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the behavioral alternatives in any 
detail. We shall confine ourselves to a couple of examples of what we have in mind. The 
examples concern assumptions that affect the role of aggregate demand in the medium 
and long run, and we shall focus on medium- and long-run steady states rather than the 
stability of these steady states.  
5.1 The medium run: Fairness and the ‘natural rate of unemployment’ 
The existence of a ‘natural rate of unemployment’ has been a mainstay of NK models, 
and the extensions of the AD-AS models by Chiarella and Flaschel (2000) share this 
feature; the natural rate of unemployment may not be asymptotically stable in their 
models, but cycles take place around a structurally determined long-run equilibrium 
(except for a brief sketch in their final chapter on the “road ahead”). The existence of a 
natural rate of unemployment implies that aggregate demand plays (almost) no role in the 
determination of the trend of output and the average long-run value of the unemployment 
rate. We find this aspect of the models questionable, both empirically and theoretically.   
Money wages may be sticky partly because workers care about relative wages (as 
suggested by Keynes).  This argument implies a rejection of a traditional view of 
preferences as defined over the agent's own consumption. Instead, a notion of fairness 
becomes central, and the behavioral literature has provided strong support for the role of 
  21‘fairness’ in wage formation (see, for instance, Bewley, 1998, Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 
Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). The literature also shows that changes in nominal wages are 
relevant for the perceived fairness of the wage offer. The relevance of nominal changes 
implies a kind of ‘money illusion’. As a result, there is no natural rate of unemployment. 
Instead, a downward sloping Phillips curve emerges, and demand policies may affect real 
output and employment in the medium and long run (Shafir et al., 1997, Akerlof et al., 
1996).  
A more radical conclusion can be obtained if it is recognized that norms of 
fairness may change over time and that the prevailing wage norms are strongly 
influenced by the actual wage patterns in the past. Thus, according to Kahneman et al. 
(1986, p. 730-1) notions of fairness tend to adjust gradually to actual outcomes:
20  
the reference transaction provides a basis for fairness judgments because it is normal, not because 
it is just. Psychological studies of adaptation suggest that any stable state of affairs tends to 
become accepted eventually, at least in the sense that alternatives to it no longer readily come to 
mind. Terms of exchange that are initially seen as unfair may in time acquire the status of 
reference transaction. Thus, the gap between the behavior that people consider fair and the 
behavior that they expect in the market-place tends to be rather small. 
 
Skott (1999, 2005) shows that this conventional aspect of wage norms may lead to 
employment hysteresis, even in models that exclude money illusion of any kind.
21 If 
inflationary expectations are formed adaptively and adjustments in wage norms take a 
simple linear form, the models generate a downward-sloping Phillips curve. In general, 
however, aggregate demand policy will affect output in the medium run, but there will be 
no well-behaved Phillips relation, vertical or downward–sloping, between employment 
and the inflation rate. 
  These examples illustrate how lessons from behavioral economics may cast doubt 
on the natural rate hypothesis.
22 Theoretical doubts might not carry a lot of weight if the 
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the framework concede that the applicability of the theory may be limited. Thus, Gordon 
(1997, p. 28) concludes that 
Within the postwar experience of the United States, the modest fluctuations in the NAIRU seem 
plausible in magnitude and timing. When applied to Europe or to the United States in the Great 
Depression, however, fluctuations in the NAIRU seem too large to be plausible and seem mainly 
to mimic movements in the actual unemployment rate. 
 
From a Popperian perspective, Gordon's reading of the evidence must imply that the 
theory should be rejected. 
5.2 The long run: Growth, accumulation and technological change 
Models of the long run, which introduce capital accumulation, technological change and 
labor supply growth, are generally of two varieties.   
By far the more popular one is the one in which aggregate demand disappears 
from the scene and aggregate supply determines growth.  In fact, neoclassical growth 
theory following Solow (1956), and new growth theory, following Romer (1986) and 
others, abstracts entirely from the AD side, assuming perpetual full employment and 
investment being determined identically by saving.  The debate between neoclassical and 
new growth theory revolves around whether or not the marginal product of the produced 
factor of production, capital, falls to zero as the capital-labor ratio rises indefinitely and, 
therefore, whether long-run growth is affected by the saving rate and other economic 
variables.  The neglect of AD is usually not explicitly explained in these models, but it is 
implicitly assumed that wage and price flexibility will remove unemployment in the 
medium run or, failing that, that government aggregate demand policy will do the job.  
Thus, the long-run growth path is independent of AD factors. 
  23A less popular variety, with roots in the Keynesian theories of Harrod (1939), 
Robinson (1962) and others, focuses on AD as determining growth.  In these models 
growth is determined by the interaction between aggregate demand and supply factors 
(including, for instance, firms’ pricing decisions). Some work in this tradition has 
included the labor market explicitly and linked the long-run rate of growth of output to 
the growth of the labor supply in efficiency units (see, for instance, Kaldor 1957, Skott 
1989, Dutt 1992a).  Most models, however, do not impose the requirement that the 
unemployment rate be constant in the long run but simply assume that the labor supply 
does not constrain the rate of growth (see Marglin, 1984, Dutt, 1984, Taylor, 1991). 
These models have many interesting implications, including the possibility that a more 
equal distribution of income can increase the rate of growth and that technological 
change can have immiserizing effects, and the assumption of no labor constraints can be 
defended by pointing to the existence of large amounts of hidden unemployment in the 
primary and tertiary sectors in most countries, developed as well as less developed, until 
some time in the post World War II period. For the more recent period, however, the 
hidden-unemployment argument may not be persuasive, at least for advanced industrial 
countries. Most of the OECD economies arguably have become ‘mature’ in Kaldor’s 
(1966) sense: they certainly have unemployment, both open and disguised, but it would 
be misleading to treat the labor supply to the modern sector as perfectly elastic and to 
disregard the labor constraints on the long-run rate of growth. Even under conditions of 
maturity, however, the rate of growth may be influenced by aggregate demand.  
As argued in section 5.1, the rate of employment can not be taken as independent 
of the demand side, even in the medium run, and this dependence of employment on 
  24aggregate demand opens up ways in which demand may also influence the rate of growth 
in the long run.  
One channel runs through migration. Even if a country has exhausted its domestic 
reserves of hidden unemployment, the possibility of immigration provides an 
international reserve army and, immigration laws permitting, the growth rate of the 
country need not be limited by its labor supply. Immigration laws respond to economic 
conditions (as evidenced, for instance, by the change in attitudes of European countries 
between the 1960s and the more recent period), and the employment rate can therefore 
have a significant effect on the rate of growth of the labor force.
23  
Induced technical progress represents a second possible channel. Labor shortages 
provide an incentive for firms to seek out new labor saving techniques, and this 
technology channel suggests that the rate of growth of the labor supply in efficiency units 
may be positively related to the employment rate. Both the employment and technology 
channels imply that insofar as aggregate demand policy influences the rate of 
employment, it also affects the long-run rate of growth (Flaschel and Skott, 2005).
24
  A more radical approach is pursued by Dutt (2005) who considers a range of 
models in which the rate of labor productivity growth responds to labor market 
conditions, with tight labor markets speeding up labor-saving technological change. One 
of the models makes the employment rate affect both changes in the ‘autonomous’ 
investment parameter (to capture the effects of unemployment and wage reductions on 
aggregate demand through the Keynes effect) and the rate of labor productivity growth.  
Since the same rate of employment makes investment and labor productivity growth 
stationary, the result is a zero root model in which a change in the level of autonomous 
  25demand (for instance, government expenditure) has a permanent effect on the long-run 
rate of growth.  The economy converges to its long-run rate of growth, at which the 
economy grows with unemployment at its ‘natural’ rate, but the long-run rate of growth 
itself is affected by aggregate demand.  AD and AS grow at the same rate, but the growth 
rate of the economy is not independent of factors determining AD.  
 
6. Conclusion 
We have argued in this paper that the older Keynesian tradition based on the aggregate 
demand-aggregate supply framework provides a more suitable and promising framework 
for building macroeconomics than the currently-dominant approach, including its New 
Keynesian variant.   This is so for a number of reasons. 
  Contrary to what has been argued by a number of critics, first, the traditional 
aggregate demand-aggregate supply approach is internally consistent, at least in its 
Marshallian interpretation, as well as consistent with Keynes’s own analysis.   
  Second, it has the strength of explicitly including the major markets and sectors of 
the economy and examining their interactions. In this sense it is a general, rather than a 
partial, theory.  Walrasian general equilibrium theory may also be general in this sense, 
but is different in several ways, including the perspective on behavioral foundations. 
  Third, the aggregate demand-aggregate supply approach does not insist on 
optimizing microfoundations. The AD-AS model is not necessarily inconsistent with 
optimizing behavior, but the approach is eclectic. It starts with some basic and 
commonly-used accounting identities, adds rules of behavior of individuals or groups in 
specific institutional settings, and examines their consequences for the performance and 
  26evolution of the system. The theorist must be prepared to explain and defend the choice 
of behavioral rules, but an appeal to optimization is neither necessary nor sufficient for a 
successful defense. This eclecticism, we have argued, is a strength, and the New 
Keynesian methodological position is flawed. New Keynesian macroeconomics has 
produced interesting insights, but the insistence on optimizing microfoundations means 
that these insights have come at the cost of neglecting a variety of important issues, 
including the analysis of stability. 
  Fourth, it is true that a great deal of analysis using the aggregate demand–
aggregate supply framework is mechanical and fails to capture important aspects of 
reality, and its extensions to medium- and long-run issues typically ignore the role of 
aggregate demand.  However, unencumbered by the straightjacket of optimizing 
microfoundations, the approach provides a useful starting point for the analysis of 
dynamic macroeconomic interactions.  In developing this analysis, the approach can draw 
on insights from the Post Keynesian, neo-Marxian and structuralist traditions, as well as 
from the burgeoning literature on behavioral economics. 
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1 According to the preface to the French edition of the GT, written three years after the English publication, 
Keynes (1936/1973, p. xxxii) explains: 
 
I have called my theory a general theory. I mean by this that I am chiefly concerned with the 
behavior of the economic system as a whole, - with aggregate incomes, aggregate profits, 
aggregate output, aggregate employment, aggregate investment, aggregate saving rather than with 
the incomes, profits, output, employment, investment and saving of particular industries, firms and 
individuals. And I argue that important mistakes have been made through extending to the system 
as a whole conclusions which have been arrived at in respect of a part of it taken in isolation. 
 
2  The dynamics can be explicitly formalized by the equations 
 
dP/dt = βG [C+I+G-Y] 
 
dr/dt = βA [L-(M/P)], 
 
where t denotes time and 2i  > 0 are speed of adjustment parameters for the goods and asset markets. 
 
3  If we introduce real balance effects which make C (and, possibly, I) depend positively on M/P, the IS 
curve would be negatively sloped rather than vertical.  We abstract from this complication here, but refer to 
it later.  
 




e/dt =βE  [P – P
e ] 
 
where 2E  >0 is the speed of expectations adjustment parameter. 
  
5  For a discussion of the history of the AD-AS model, including that of its emergence and spread in 
macroeconomic textbooks, see Dutt (2002).  
 
6 See Dutt and Skott (1996) for further discussion of the internal-consistency criticisms. 
 
7  He probably used this type of diagram, rather than that in (P, Y) space, because aggregate price level and 
real output were not in common use in his day, while value of output and total employment, involving 
fewer aggregation problems, were. 
 
8  Keynes’s Aggregate Demand function does not actually use the simultaneous equations approach to 
solving P, focusing only on goods market equilibrium without taking into account asset markets explicitly.  
An alternative formulation of the model, which focuses only on the goods market, but allows consumption 
demand to respond to price changes due to either the real balance effect or distribution shifts, can easily be 
developed.  See Dutt (1987) for a version in which changes in price affect the value of output through 
changes in income distribution between wages and profits. 
 
9 The Treatise on Money had concentrated on the Marshallian ultra-short  run (or market run) equilibrium: 
My so-called `fundamental equations' were an instantaneous picture taken on the assumption of a 
given output. They attempted to show how, assuming the given output, forces could develop 
which involved a profit-disequilibrium, and thus required a change in the level of output. But the 
dynamic development, as distinct from the instantaneous picture, was left incomplete and 
extremely confused (Keynes, 1936/1973, p. xxii). 
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Skott (1989, 1989a) develops a model of cyclical growth using the Marshallian (or Keynes-of-the-Treatise) 
ultra-short run equilibrium as the basic building block; see also Skott (1983) for a discussion of this 
Marshallian approach and the relation between the Treatise on Money and the GT. 
 
10 For a review of post Keynesian contributions see Dutt and Amadeo.  For more mainstream discussions, 
see Hicks (1980-81), Tobin (1975) and Meltzer (1988).  
 
11 See, for instance, Moore (1988). New Keynesians have also abandoned the exogenous-money 
assumption, but rather than stressing the nature of monetary institutions, they focus on the specific policy 
rule adopted by the Central Bank in the US and elsewhere (e.g. Romer, 2000, Woodford 2003)). 
 
12  In the context of our simple specification, however, it is easy to prove that local stability carries over to 
the case where P, P
e and r are all treated as state variables, with their dynamics shown by the equations in 
notes 2 and 4.    
 
13 In a set of lecture notes from 1937, Keynes argues as follows: 
 
When one is dealing with aggregates, aggregate effective demand at time A has no 
corresponding aggregate income at time B. All one can compare is the expected and actual income 
resulting to an entrepreneur from a particular decision. Actual investment may differ through 
unintended stock changes, price changes, alteration of decision. The difference, if any, is due to a 
mistake in the short-period expectation and the importance of the difference lies in the fact that 
this difference will be one of the relevant factors in determining subsequent effective demand. 
I began, as I have said, by regarding this difference as important. But eventually I felt it 
to be of secondary importance, emphasis on it obscuring the real argument. For the theory of 
effective demand is substantially the same if we assume that short-period expectations are always 
fulfilled. (Keynes 1973, p. 181) 
 
14 Hicks (1974) used the term Keynes’s ‘wage theorem’ to denote the benchmark result that variations in 
money wages have no net effects on real output and employment in a closed economy'. 
 
15  Some contributions are adventurous enough to depart from optimization to invoke ‘near’ rationality!  
See Akerlof and Yellen (1987). 
 
16 It can be argued that problems related to information gathering and computational ability need not 
undermine the neoclassical optimizing hypothesis, because this hypothesis does not assume rationality in 
an empirical sense (whatever that means), but simply uses the organizing framework of analyzing behavior 
in terms of the optimization some objective function subject to some constraints (see Boland, 1981).  This 
argument, however, suggests that there is no overriding justification for insisting on the use of the 
optimizing approach (for instance, based on some notion of the rationality of economic agents), and that a 
non-optimizing approach need not be inferior to the neoclassical one. 
 
17 The Japanese stagnation in the 1990s may have alerted the profession to some stability issues, and the 
`liquidity trap' has made a comeback (e.g. Krugman 1998). The liquidity trap arises because of an inability 
of monetary policy to reduce interest rates, that is, to change intertemporal prices. It seems to have escaped 
attention, however, that the liquidity trap and the problem of intertemporal prices are indicative of the 
general stability problem. Money wage reductions fail to solve the unemployment problem because 
"[a]ccording to Keynes' diagnosis, it is fundamentally the intertemporal relative values observed or implicit 
in the actual vector that are ‘wrong’", and, "although the most eye-catching symptom of maladjustment is 
the great excess supply in the labor markets, ...  the burden of adjustment should not be thrown on this 
market.” (Leijonhufvud, 1968, p. 338 and 336; italics in original) 
 
18  The learning argument is particularly vulnerable with respect to some of the key variables of 
macroeconomic interest - saving for retirement, for instance, or educational choices (investment in human 
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capital) - where essentially each agent makes only a single decision. Parental background and experience 
may be a critical influence on these choices but for backward rather than forward looking reasons. 
 
19 Joan Robinson's criticism of tatonnement-based stability should have provided additional impetus for 
this shift, but her criticism was not widely understood (e.g. Robinson (1962, pp. 23-29), Skott (2005a)). 
 
20    The conventional aspect of fairness is implicit in many discussions of these issues.  Keynes (1930a), for 
instance, expressed his sympathy with the view that "there is a large arbitrary element in the relative rates 
of remuneration, and the factors of production get what they do, not because in any strict sense they 
precisely earn it, but because past events have led to these rates being customary and usual" (quoted from 
Keynes 1981, p. 7). Marshall (1887) noted that fairness must be defined "with reference to the methods of 
industry, the habits of life and the character of the people" (p.212). Fairness, he argues, requires that a 
worker 
ought to be paid for his work at the usual rate for his trade and neighbourhood; so that he may live 
in that way to which he and his neighbours in his rank of life have been accustomed. (p. 213; 
italics added) 
Similar views have been advocated by Hicks (1974) and Solow (1990). 
 
21  Here we use the term hysteresis in a broad sense to include zero-root models, and not just models with 
‘remanence’ (see Cross, 1988).  
 
22 Other theoretical and arguments against the natural rate hypothesis are discussed in, for instance, Cross 
(1988, 1995). 
 
23 This channel may be reinforced by the effects of unemployment on changes in the labor force 
participation rate; women’s participation rate and the average retirement age, for instance, may respond 
gradually to labor market conditions. 
  
24 Verdoorn’s-law effects in which learning by doing generates a positive impact of the rate of growth of 
output on productivity growth imply an additional stimulus from faster immigration to productivity growth.  
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